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Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to propose a financially viable alternative to the current Spanish system 
of social protection: A Negative Income Tax (NIT) unifying in a single mechanism the system of pub-
lic benefits and income tax. We analyse the main characteristics of the NIT and simulate several NIT 
proposals for Spain, using the Living Conditions Survey. These proposals are distinct in that they do 
not suppose an additional cost in the tax-benefit system. The results of our simulations indicate a radi-
cal improvement in the indicators of poverty and inequality, especially extreme poverty, and also a 
redistribution of income from the elderly to families with children.
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1.  Introduction
One of the most disappointing results of social policy is that strong economic growth in 
recent decades has not led to a reduction in poverty in European countries (Cantó, 2018; 
European Commission, 2018). This situation has been aggravated by the economic crisis, 
which has led countries such as Spain to poverty rates above 22%. According to the EURO-
STAT data, in 2015 Spanish social transfers managed to reduce the poverty rate in 8 percent-
age points (from 30.1% to 22.1%), less than the UE average 8.8 points (from 26.1% to 
17.3%). 
Among the proposed measures to fight poverty is the creation of a Basic Income (BI). A 
BI would consist of a universal and unconditional benefit that would replace current non-
contributory benefits of the welfare state1. The BI could be implemented through one of two 
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mechanisms: through a periodic, monetary and personal transfer; or using the Tax Adminis-
tration with a Negative Income Tax (hereinafter, NIT).
Although these two alternatives are theoretically equivalent, NIT manages to combine 
the tax system and the public benefit system into a single mechanism, which has three main 
advantages. Firstly, it would avoid revenue and expenditure inconsistencies (i.e., an ex-
empted minimum pension scheme producing reorder effects), as they would be adjusted by 
NIT. Secondly, the progressivity of the whole tax-benefit system would be ensured. Finally, 
it would simplify the management of the system, favouring its transparency and support 
among citizens (Sanzo and Pinilla, 2004).
A progressive income tax, such as the current Spanish Personal Income Tax (PIT), has 
a significant redistributive effect, far above social contributions and indirect taxes (Onrubia 
and Rodado, 2014) and even greater than many public benefits (Cantó, 2013). However, this 
redistribution effect does not take into account people who do not pay any tax because their 
income is too low. The NIT would also consider these citizens, not only when they do not 
pay taxes but also when they would receive a public benefit in the form of BI.
In the second section of this paper, we detail the basic characteristics of NIT, relating 
them to the historical origin of these proposals as well as analysing their basic elements. In 
the third section, we simulate different alternatives of our NIT proposal, which will natu-
rally take as a base scenario the previous estimate of the current Spanish PIT. For this, we 
use the micro-data of the Survey of Living Conditions. In section four, we collect the main 
results of NIT, and in the fifth we analyse poverty and inequality effects. Finally, the sixth 
section presents the main conclusions.
2.  Negative Income Tax Characteristics
Tax and social protection systems have traditionally been studied in isolation. However, 
there is an increasing tendency to move towards integrating them. This integration has clear 
advantages, since it makes the system more transparent and coherent, while removing the 
need to establish means tested mechanisms associated with each benefit (Mirrlees, 2011).
In this sense, within the tax system, and especially in the area of income tax, tax expen-
ditures (allowances, deductions from the tax base, tax credits, etc.) introduce unnecessary 
complexity and distortions and, above all, undermine the redistributive capacity and tax 
progression. In other words, individuals and families with lower incomes are often less fa-
voured by several tax credits, as the tax payable works as a threshold. It is in this environ-
ment that the possibility of introducing new instruments would be considered as integrating, 
within the income tax, the two aspects previously mentioned: the question of taxation and of 
social protection. From this point of view, a number of instruments have been proposed such 
as refundable tax credits, which allow the tax payable to become negative, changing it into 
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a net benefit (Oliver and Spadarao, 2017; Ayala and Paniagua, 2018). From this point of 
view, the NIT could be considered as a generalization of a refundable tax credit.
The origin of the NIT is often associated with the American economist Milton Friedman, 
although previous proposals exist that pose a very similar tax-subsidy system. The most 
relevant is the proposal of Rhys-Williams (1943). According to this British politician, the 
State should provide a minimum income (called ‘National Dividend’) to every working per-
son or every person willing to work. This plan would be financed through a proportional tax 
on income, where national dividend would be subtracted from the taxable income. That is, 
the national dividend received for every citizen would not be part of taxable income2. 
However, the most famous proposal is that of Friedman, who proposes a NIT with a 
single 50% tax rate (Friedman, 1962; Friedman and Friedman, 1980). According to Fried-
man, a NIT would have several advantages over traditional public subsidy programs. Firstly, 
it would be specifically directed at solving the problem of poverty by providing cash assis-
tance. Secondly, the cost of this measure would be explicit for society. Thirdly, the disincen-
tive effect on labour supply would be lower than with other types of aid. Finally, Friedman 
stresses that joint management of the tax-subsidy program would reduce administration 
costs.
Friedman’s proposal opened an important debate around the idea of a NIT; a debate 
which reached a peak in the 60s and 70s of the last century3, with several experiments being 
carried out in the USA. Even President Nixon made a NIT proposal for the whole country, 
which, ultimately, was not implemented. The academic debate on a NIT declined in subse-
quent decades, but reappeared when its use was considered as a possible mechanism for a 
BI, both in Spain (Martínez Álvarez, 2002; Pinilla, 2002; Sanzo and Pinilla, 2004) and in 
other countries (Moffitt , 2003; Hamilton, 2010; Sommer, 2016).
From the perspective of BI, other reasons have been used to support a NIT. Firstly, it 
would be a useful mechanism to increase individual choice, since each individual could 
choose his or her own lifestyle once their basic needs were assured by BI (Van Parijs, 1995). 
Secondly, in line with the principles of redistributive justice (Rawls, 1971), NIT establishes 
a right to a decent living standard for all citizens, regardless of their personal circumstances. 
In addition, important technical advantages over other aid programs can be highlighted (Sal-
vador, 2016): the elimination of the poverty trap, as well as differences in coverage and 
treatment of current programs; a reduction in fiscal spending by removing deductions, tax 
credits and tax rebates thus providing an additional source of funding for this measure; 
greater flexibility of the labour market, since workers could more easily adapt to fluctuations 
in work availability knowing they have subsistence conditions.
Obviously, the NIT has also received criticism. The first one would be the high cost of 
such a measure. While it is true that the first proposals of a NIT would have led to prohibitive 
costs, there are now alternatives that reduce costs significantly. The second criticism is that 
it discriminates against those who work. This criticism is hardly defensible, since all citizens 
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would receive the same amount of subsidy regardless of their situation in the labour market. 
Thirdly, its negative impact on labour supply has been criticized. However, it should be 
clarified that this problem is common in all income maintenance programs, and the empirical 
evidence is inconclusive (Sommer, 2016). The last criticism refers to the pull effect that such 
a measure could have. This problem can be solved with the regulation of the measure, estab-
lishing certain requirements of residence.
Figure 1 shows the basic characteristics of a NIT, as defined by Friedman, as well as its 
relationship with Income Tax (IT) and BI. Actually, a NIT would be formed by the combina-
tion of a tax with a subsidy for all citizens. The IT would tax all taxpayers at a single rate 
from their first euro of income, as it appears on the dotted line. The universal grant (BI) 
would be the same amount for all citizens regardless of their income. These two measures 
(IT and BI) can operate independently, but can also be instrumented together through an NIT. 
For this, we simply have to obtain the resulting balance of IT payable for each citizen, minus 
the BI they are entitled to receive. For some people this balance will be positive, leading to 
a payment of tax to the Tax Administration, while others will get a negative balance, there-
fore receiving a subsidy.
Figure 1: Relationships between NIT, BI and IT
Source: Own elaboration.
When designing a NIT, it is important to set two of these three elements:
•	 The	Tax	Rate	(TR):	a	high	TR	could	have	a	disincentive	effect	on	the	labour	supply,	
both in the negative part of the tax and in the positive part, while a very low tax rate 
would generate an insufficient BI.
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•	 Minimum	Exemption	(ME):	 income	level	from	which	the	IT	paid	would	be	higher	
than the BI received, i.e., the balance between tax and subsidy would be positive. 
Below this amount the individual would receive a net grant.
•	 BI	amount:	 the	minimum	amount	for	survival,	which	 is	usually	set	on	 the	basis	of	
some poverty threshold. 
These three elements are related to each other and, as such, any of them can be calcu-
lated from the other two. For example, having specified the amount of the Minimum Exempt 
and Tax Rate, the BI would be determined as: BI = ME x TR. 
The NIT designed by Friedman is a relatively simple theoretical model. However, for it 
to be implemented it would be necessary to take a number of decisions to solve various op-
erational problems. In addition to establishing the level of BI and the TR, one must choose 
an individual or family configuration of the tax, whether or not regional differences should 
be considered and how to obtain the resources to finance the system. In Granell and Fuen-
mayor (2016) the advantages and disadvantages of all these alternatives are analysed.
3.  Simulating a Negative Income Tax for Spain
In order to evaluate the effects of fiscal reforms, microsimulation techniques are a fun-
damental instrument since they allow the calculation of the impact of a fiscal reform on 
thousands of real families. Likewise, when the data source used is representative of the 
population, it is possible to analyse the consequences of the tax reform in terms of both tax 
collection and distribution over different population groups.
3.1. Microsimulation of 2013 Spanish Income Tax
The simulation of any tax proposal requires, as a previous step, a simulation of the cur-
rent situation to function as a base scenario. Only then will we be able to compare the results 
of the proposal made with the real life situation. Therefore, our first task is to simulate the 
current Spanish Income Tax. We used the Living Conditions Survey for 2014 (Encuesta de 
Condiciones de Vida, ECV, 2014), whose household income data refer to 2013. For this 
reason, we performed the 2013 IT simulation, and made some adjustments to socio-econom-
ic data corresponding to 20144.
The Spanish Income Tax is a direct, personal, and progressive tax. It is designed to be 
performed by individuals, but couples can opt for joint filing. The tax scheme is summarized 
in Figure 2. Almost every source of income must be included: from labour, property, capital 
gains and losses, even some imputed income. From this gross income, some deductible ex-
penses can be deducted to form the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). To convert AGI to Tax-
88
able Income (TI), some items can be subtracted (joint taxation deduction, pension plans, 
etc.). Separately, the Personal and Familiar Minimum (PFM) must be calculated, depending 
on personal and familiar circumstances. The next step consists on applying the Tax Schedule 
on TI and PFM separately. The first result, the Tax Payable derived from TI is positive, but 
the second one, the Tax Payable derived from PFM is negative. The net result is the Tax Pay-
able (TP). From this TP, Tax Credits (TC) are deducted, obtaining the Net Tax (NT). Finally, 
taxpayers could deduct Maternity Tax Credit, which is considered separately because is the 
only refundable Tax Credit.
When using ECV, the first issue for simulating personal income tax is to determine fiscal 
units5, since the survey data contains more complex household data. Only from the family 
units can we work out the tax payment made through joint returns and, if appropriate, com-
pare this result with the sum of the individual tax bills. In addition to the usual treatment of 
the database, we removed the observations corresponding to the Basque Country and the 
Autonomous Community of Navarre, since they have their own tax. As a result of these 
tasks, the sample finally used is made up of 28,685 individuals (23,993 adults and 4,692 
children).
The simulation of personal income tax from data using ECV has some limitations, 
since the estimation of some variables is not as accurate as the official data collected in the 
IT statistics, as can be seen in Table 1. These divergences produce some deviations in the 
estimation of different items in taxable income and in some tax credits although, in the 
end, the tax due, which would represent the IT annually paid by each taxpayer, is quite 
close to the figure that appears in the official statistics (98.4%). In any case, the importance 
Figure 2: The Spanish Income Tax
Source: Own elaboration.
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of the divergences between official data and those derived from the simulation is not cru-
cial. What really matters is to make a detailed comparison between the estimation of the 
tax in force in 2013 and the result that would have been derived from the simulation of its 
reform. 
Table 1 
MAIN RESULTS FROM 2013 SPANISH INCOME TAX MICRO-SIMULATION 
Item
Total amount (million €) (2)/(1)
(1) Official data (2) 2013IT simulation
Labour income 306,553 350,809 114.4%
Saving and Investments 18,093 16,969 93.8%
Land and property income 6,830 6,848 100.3%
Business income 22,389 26,073 116.5%
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) 369,950 401,783 108.6%
Deductions from AGI 18,391 20,614 112.1%
Taxable Income 352,245 381,169 108.2%
Tax Payable 72,084 70,327 97.6%
Housing tax credits (investment and ren-
tal)
4,191 3,454 82.4%
Net Tax 67,745 66,873 98.7%
Maternity tax credit 747 822 110.1%
Final payment 67,148 66,050 98.4%
Source: Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, ECV and own calculations.
Starting from the 2013 Spanish IT, the main purpose of this paper is to simulate a tax 
modification in line with the introduction of a NIT. In Spain, Sanzo and Pinilla (2004) per-
formed a simulation with the EspaSim program of a BI as a deduction in the NIT with a 
single rate of 50%, later modified to 45%. Arcarons et al. (2014) performed a simulation 
using the administrative data (Muestra IEF-AEAT 2010) with a single tax rate of 49.5%. 
Undoubtedly, these previous works are of great interest, working with microdata and obtain-
ing tax results that can be extrapolated to the Spanish population. However, the data used in 
these studies do not allow calculations of the benefits who receive each citizen, so they can-
not complete a tax-benefit analysis.
In our case, we simulate a NIT that is financially viable and that considers the set of 
taxes and benefits of the welfare state at a household level. Considering taxes and also ben-
efits, we will be able to estimate at an individual level which people would benefit and which 
would lose under a NIT scheme. In addition, we will better understand the influence of the 
new NIT on the main indicators of inequality and poverty.
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3.2. A first approach
As a starting point, we performed a first simulation exercise, introducing the least pos-
sible changes regarding the current Spanish IT. The idea that motivated this initial pro-
posal was to keep the 2013 Spanish IT unchanged for the positive part (when the final tax 
bill is positive) and to introduce changes in the negative part (when the tax becomes a 
benefit). The main change regarding the Personal Income Tax was to allow taxpayers 
whose Personal and Family Allowance (see Figure 2) was higher than their taxable base to 
receive a benefit in the form of a negative tax. In addition, we allow all taxpayers to apply 
the tax credits for housing, regardless of their tax payable. In other words, these tax cred-
its would be reimbursable so that people with lower incomes could benefit from them. In 
this first exercise we did not eliminate any public benefits. These benefits would be com-
plementary to the NIT itself.
Results indicate that, although this NIT proposal could have very important effects on 
the reduction of poverty and inequality, its cost in terms of revenue would be very high. It 
should be noted that with this first proposal there would be no losers: people with middle and 
high incomes would remain in the same situation, whereas those with low income would 
receive the corresponding subsidy from negative tax. According to our estimates, the tax 
collection would be reduced from approximately 66,000 million to 18,000 million euros. 
Funding of these 48 billion € would be unworkable without the introduction of new sources 
of income or a significant cut in public benefits and services. For this reason, it is essential 
to work out alternative proposals that have an affordable cost for the government.
3.3. A financially viable NIT: different proposals
In order to make a financially viable NIT proposal, there are alternative options. Of 
course, new sources of income could be sought, such as an increase in taxes (direct or indi-
rect) or higher social security contributions. However, obtaining almost 50,000 million euros 
annually through this type of actions is not feasible. On the expenditure side, public services 
or welfare benefits could also be reduced, but they would also be highly unpopular measures 
that would worsen the redistribution of income.
Our goal is to find a NIT that is self-financing and, therefore, does not require addi-
tional resources. To achieve this financial sufficiency, we can count on two main sources of 
revenue. In the first place, non-contributory public benefits, which are intended to solve or 
at least alleviate the situation of need of certain people, would no longer make sense. After 
the introduction of a NIT, all these people would become net beneficiaries and would no 
longer require other public aid. Of course, in order to eliminate these benefits, the NIT would 
have to guarantee all citizens a basic income that equals or exceeds the amount of these non-
contributory benefits. Secondly, the positive side of the NIT must be able to get more revenue 
than the current Spanish IT. To achieve this, different reforms could be undertaken. The most 
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obvious would be to raise tax rates to raise revenues, but also various existing tax benefits 
could be removed, such as deductions in the tax base or tax credits from the tax payable.
Following these premises, we will present various NIT proposals. All of them have com-
mon elements. These are limits that we have not wanted to change in order not to distort the 
economic and social meaning of these taxes. We will now describe these common elements.
Eliminated benefits
The new NIT implies the removal of non-contributory benefits, as the essential needs are 
covered with the Basic Income contained in the negative tax itself. As these benefits are not 
listed separately from the general information offered by the ECV, we asked the Spanish 
Institute of Statistics (INE) for this disaggregation. Finally, we suppressed the following non-
contributory benefits to all the beneficiaries: economic benefit per child or child in care; 
economic benefits for child birth or adoption; economic benefit for multiple childbirth or 
adoption; other family benefits; social assistance benefits; housing benefits; unemployment 
assistance; income guarantee benefit (Renta Activa de Inserción); other unemployment ben-
efits; other sickness benefits; non-contributory disability pension; school grants or education 
allowances. In addition, despite not being officially non-contributory benefits, we also de-
cided to remove the minimum complement to pensions. In our opinion, this amount seeks to 
ensure a vital minimum that would already be covered by the NIT. According to our esti-
mates, based on the data provided by INE, these benefits represent a total amount of 20,890 
million euros in 2013, an amount that could be used to finance the new negative tax.
Equivalent tax collection
The new NIT must achieve the same revenue as the previous 2013 Spanish IT (66,050 
million). We allowed an adjustment margin of 0.1% (66 million). The removal of non-con-
tributory benefits would go some way to meeting this amount by providing 20,890 million, 
but there would still be a shortfall of more than 45,000 million, which the NIT itself would 
need to generate.
Simplicity
The NIT must have a structure as simple as possible. This simplicity would facilitate 
people’s understanding of its function and would minimize the distortions generated by the 
tax benefits existing in the current 2013 Spanish IT. In this sense we propose the following 
changes: eliminate joint taxation, establishing mandatory individual taxation; return to a 
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single tax base, abolishing the existing dual tax; eliminate deductions in the tax base (income 
from work and contributions to pension schemes); remove tax credits (for housing and ma-
ternity). The elimination of all these tax benefits will generate an increase in the collection, 
which will go a long way to financing the negative part of the tax.
A uniform and sufficient Basic Income
The amount of BI, implicit in the design of the NIT, will be identical for all residents in 
Spain. We will not take into account differences in age, personal or family circumstances. 
The only exception, as it has been proposed in other works, concerns minors. Children would 
be entitled to a lower amount than the one proposed for adults, because the additional ex-
penditure of a child in a household usually is lower than the expenditure of an adult. How-
ever, there is no agreement in the literature about the most suitable percentage to take into 
account the expenditure of the children. The implicit equivalence scale of the 2013 Spanish 
income tax was 35.6% for children (the Personal and Familiar Minimum was €5,151 for an 
adult and €1,836 for a child). The previous works about BI published in Spain recommend 
a BI for minors equal to 30% of the corresponding income for adults (Sanzo and Pinilla, 
2004; Gimeno, 2015), except Arcarons et al. (2014), who suggest a 20%-30% range. In this 
paper, following this previous works and the most used and accepted equivalence scale, the 
OECD scale, we propose a percentage of 30% of BI.
BI should be of a sufficient amount to meet basic needs in our society. Although it is 
difficult to reach a consensus on this amount, it could be based on a generally accepted pov-
erty threshold, as a percentage of the average or median, as it appears in the Eurostat statis-
tics. However, it could also be argued that BI should reach the extreme poverty threshold 
(30-40% of the median) or should be sufficient to reach the general poverty line (60% of the 
median)6. In the present work, we have decided to take a more practical decision. As the NIT 
is going to replace the non-contributory benefits of the current system, the necessary condi-
tion is that the NIT is always above the minimum non-contributory Social Security pension 
in 2013 (€ 5,108.60). This amount would be close to 40% of the median equivalent income. 
With this amount, we can conclude that the NIT would ensure that only a very basic level of 
needs is met.
Starting from the four common elements that we have just analysed, we made three NIT 
proposals, summarized in Table 2.
The first proposal (a) is undoubtedly the simplest. This is a NIT as defined by Friedman, 
with a single tax rate of 50%, both for positive and for negative parts. The minimum exemp-
tion for adults would mean that only those with an income higher than €10,310 would be 
taxed, while those with a lower income would receive a benefit that could reach a maximum 
of €5,155 per year (slightly above the current non-contributory pension). Minors who did not 
obtain any income, could receive €1,547 per year from the NIT.
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Table 2 
THREE NIT PROPOSALS WITH SIMILAR TAX COLLECTION 
Proposals (a) (b) (c)
Minimum Exemption (adults) 10,310 10,643 10,870
Minimum Exemption (minors) 3,093 3,193 3,261
Basic Income  (adults) 5,155 5,108.60 5,108.60




48% (TP ≤ 12.800)
56% (TP > 12.800)
47% (TP ≤ 0)
50% (TP ≤ 21,000)
60% (TP > 21,000)
Source: Own elaboration.
When looking for alternatives to this first proposal, undoubtedly the most obvious would 
be to try to reduce the tax rate applied. However, with the limitations set out above, there is 
very little margin for such a reduction. If we want to keep the level of tax collection constant 
and the BI at the minimum non-contributory pension amount (€5,108.60) the tax rate must 
be 49.62%. This alternative would be virtually identical to the view above so we have not 
simulated it.
Where there is room for change is in the distribution of the tax burden under the NIT. 
Instead of using a single rate, various types of tax rates could be introduced with the aim of 
increasing progressivity. In any case, it should be remembered that a NIT with a single tax 
rate actually behaves as a progressive tax, provided it includes a minimum exemption. Pro-
posal (b) considers two types of taxation: a rate of 48% for negative tax bases (where the 
minimum exemption is higher than income) and also for the positive ones that do not exceed 
€12,800 and a marginal rate of 56% for Taxable Income above this amount. The proposal (c) 
tries to differentiate more tax rates according to the level of income, establishing three tax 
brackets. As can be seen, the margin of adjustment is not very large if we want to keep the 
same tax collection. It is true that the tax rate for lower income may be slightly reduced at 
the expense of taxpayers who earn more, but these changes cannot be excessive7.
4.  Main results of Negative Taxation 
In Table 3 we present the main results of the NIT simulations under the assumptions 
described in the previous section. As can be seen, in the three proposals the Adjusted Gross 
Income8 is much higher than the one existing in 2013, mainly due to the elimination of the 
labour income deduction. This difference is even greater in terms of Taxable Income, by 
eliminating two important tax benefits: joint taxation and reduction by contributions to pen-
sion schemes. However, the Minimum Exemption would be much higher than the 2013 
Personal and Family Minimum, for several reasons. Firstly, this amount almost doubles the 
individual level, up to more than €10,000 for all adults. Secondly, with the disappearance of 
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joint taxation, everybody would be entitled to the minimum regardless of their marital status. 
Finally, all minors would benefit from a higher minimum exemption. The small differences 
in the minimum exemption at the individual level among the three proposals also lead to 
different amounts at the aggregate level.
The biggest difference with respect to the 2013 Spanish IT has to do with the calculation 
of Tax Payable. The minimum exemption would now produce negative tax payable, so the 
aggregated amount is seriously reduced. The elimination of tax credits for housing and ma-
ternity leads to final payments for the three proposals that slightly exceed 45,000 million. 
This amount is clearly lower than that obtained in 2013, but thanks to the disappearance of 
non-contributory benefits, a total collection of 66,000 million would finally be reached, 
practically identical to that achieved with the 2013 Personal Income Tax.
Table 3 









Labour income 350,809 433,538 433,538 433,538
Business income 26,073 26,073 26,073 26,073
Other income 24,901 23,758 23,758 23,758
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) 401,783 483,370 483,370 483,370
Deductions from AGI 20,614 - - -
Taxable Income 381,169 483,370 483,370 483,370
Personal and Familiar Minimum 
(M. Exemption)
136,521 393,938 406,659 415,311
Tax Payable 70,327 45,217 45,157 45,109
Housing tax credits 3,454 - - -
Net Tax 66,873 45,217 45,157 45,109
Maternity tax credit 822 - - -
Final payment 66,050 45,217 45,157 45,109
Removed Benefits - 20,890 20,890 20,890
FINAL TAX COLLECTION 66,050 66,107 66,047 65,999
Source: Own calculations.
To conclude this section, we want to analyse the results obtained with the NIT according 
to the different types of household, comparing them with the 2013 Spanish IT. In Table 4 we 
present both the number of households and the final amount paid (or received) by all of them, 
distinguishing whether it is a positive, zero or negative amount. In this comparison, we do 
not take into account the removal of social benefits, but we just compare the 2013 Spanish 
Income Tax with the three NIT proposals. Following the classification established in ECV 
2014 (hx060 variable) we have divided the households into 6 categories: households with an 
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adult of 65 or more years (1A≥65); households with two adults, at least one aged 65 or over 
(2A≥65); households with 1 adult under 65 years (1A<65); households with 2 or more adults 
under 65 (2A<65); households with an adult and children (1A+C); households with 2 or 
more adults with children (2A+C).
Panel a) in Table 4 shows the number of households in each of the 6 categories described 
and in the last row of this panel all types of households are included. As can be seen in this 
last row, there are large differences between the 2013 Spanish IT and the three NIT propos-
als. Firstly, in the 2013 Spanish IT there are more households that will end up with a tax bill 
than in the NIT (72% vs. 50% -52%). Obviously, the latter would be those households whose 
income was low enough to take advantage of the negative part of the NIT. Secondly, while 
negative statements are an exception (2%) in the 2013 Spanish IT and are due exclusively to 
the maternity deduction, with a NIT these cases would be generalized and about half of the 
households would end up receiving a net benefit. Finally, in the 2013 Spanish IT there are a 
large number of households that do not pay tax but also receive no benefit (26%). With a NIT 
such as the one proposed, there are no neutral households, since they will either pay a net tax 
or receive a net benefit, even though it might be minimal.
If we break down households according to their characteristics, we can see how the NIT 
does not affect all taxpayers equally. Those who benefit most from the negative part of the 
tax would be single-parent households, since 62% -63% of them would receive a benefit. 
After them, two-person households and couples with children are highlighted, since in both 
cases more than half of the households would receive a net grant in all three simulations. In 
the other three types of households, more than half of households would be net contributors, 
but in all cases the number of negative tax returns is greater than 40%.
Panel b) of Table 4 represents the Final Payment that would have to be paid or received 
by each of these 6 types of household. On the one hand, in aggregated terms, the NIT scheme 
is a much more powerful tool aiming redistribution. The current 2013 scheme collects 
66,050 million euros (66,307 minus 257), and distribute 20,890 million euros (Table 3). NIT 
(a), for instance, supposes a similar final impact (45,217 million euros), but collecting much 
more resources (92,178 million euros) and distributing more benefits (46,961 million euros). 
On the other hand, while it is true that in all groups there are both positive and negative 
statements, the resulting balance is very different in each type of household. Following the 
reasoning of the previous paragraph, the only households that would have negative balance 
would be the single parent, while the rest of households would end up paying a net positive 
tax to fund the benefits.
We think that the results presented are of interest because they make it possible to com-
pare the effect of two radically different taxes on households. However, with the NIT, much 
of the revenue obtained with a tax like the current one is lost. In order to be able to compare 
them in terms of equality, we need to deduct in each household the non-contributory benefits 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to find out the number of winners and losers as a result of both the introduction of NIT and 
the elimination of benefits, distinguishing between the six types of households we have pre-
viously presented.
If we focus on the last row, we can see how in all three proposals the number of house-
holds that would win is practically the same as the number of losers. In addition, in the case 
of proposals with an equivalent tax collection, the total gain or loss would be negligible. 
However, when detailing the information according to the type of household, the differences 
concerning 2013 Spanish IT are considerable. The most disadvantaged with the new NIT 
would be households with a person over 65, who in the three simulated proposals could lose, 
on average, more than €1,500. Households made up of two elderly people and an adult under 
65 years would also suffer significant losses, around €1,000 per year. The situation of cou-
ples under 65 would be quite similar to the current one, although on average they would lose 
between 118 and 172 euros. The clear winners with a NIT would be households with chil-
dren. While single-parent households would earn on average more than €800, households 
with two or more adults with children in all three simulations would average more than 
€1,400 gain.
Moreover, it is important to stress that in every type of household there is a strong redis-
tribution between poorer and richer. For example, in households composed by two adults 
younger than 65, almost half of them are winners and the other half are losers. It means that, 
although the average change for this type of household is not very important, the internal 
redistribution between rich and poor households is very intense. This effect will have strong 
results in terms of poverty and inequality.
5.  Inequality and poverty analysis
In this section we estimate the impact of NIT on inequality and poverty. Based on the 
most widespread methodological criterion in terms of poverty and inequality, we use house-
holds as a unit of measurement instead of individuals or fiscal units, using the modified 
OECD scale as an equivalence scale.
Our aim is to compare the current situation, which a PIT and a set of non-contributory 
benefits, with the proposed NIT, a single measure that includes a positive tax for taxpayers 
whose income is above the minimum exemption and a negative tax for the rest. The starting 
point will be the income before taxes and subsidies, which takes into account market income 
and contributory benefits. We compare this initial situation, in terms of inequality and pover-
ty, with the current system of PIT and non-contributory benefits and finally with the three 
alternatives of NIT proposed in the previous section.
The first results on inequality are shown in Table 6. The first column shows the Gini 
index for income before taxes and benefits and its value after introducing the 2013 PIT and, 
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finally, non-contributory benefits of the same year. We also compute the Reynolds-Smolen-
sky index, which measures the redistributive capacity of the tax, as the difference between 
the Gini index before and after income tax. As can be seen, the current tax is able to improve 
4 percentage points the distribution of income, but it does so exclusively by deducting in-
come from households. The non-contributory benefits reduce inequality another 4.1 percent-
age points, with a global improvement of 8.1 points in the Reynolds-Smolensky index. On 
the contrary, a NIT would achieve redistribution in only one step, deducting the tax from 
those who can pay it and making transfers to individuals that do not reach the minimums 
indicated.
Table 6 
 INEQUALITY INDEXES AND REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT
2013 Spanish 
System NIT (a) NIT (b) NIT (c)
Gini R-S Gini R-S Gini R-S Gini R-S
Income before taxes and benefits 0.417 - 0.417 - 0.417 - 0.417 -
Income after 2013 Income Tax 0.377 0.04 - - - - - -
Income after taxes and 
benefits/NIT
0.336 0.081 0.249 0.169 0.243 0.174 0.241 0.176
Source: Own calculations.
In the last columns of the table, Gini9 and Reynolds-Smolensky10 indices are shown for 
the three alternatives proposed. The results of the three proposals draw similar conclusions. 
The introduction of an NIT would reduce inequality much more than the current system, 
with a final Gini index below 0.25. Although the three proposed alternatives achieve a sig-
nificant redistributive effect, it should be noted that the results are different. Proposal (a), 
with a single tax rate of 50%, is the one with the lowest redistributive effect generated, while 
the second (b) and the third (c) increase this effect by introducing a progressive tax schedule 
with two and three tax brackets, respectively. 
This is a very powerful result. The introduction of a NIT such as the proposed here will 
produce strong results on redistributive indexes. As stated by Cantó (2018) “(…) to measure 
the redistributive capacity of any system, it is necessary to look at two key elements: progres-
sivity and the dimension of both direct taxes and monetary benefits for the most in need”. In 
this sense, the NIT increases both progressivity and the size of spending in social protection. 
The striking reduction of these indexes is due, among others, to the following reasons:
1) The NIT is a more powerful mechanism than the current system, because it redis-
tributes many more resources. The current system collects 66,050 million and pays 
benefits of 20,890. However, the NIT collects 92,178 million and pays benefits of 
46,961 (Table 4). This higher spending on social protection is associated with a 
stronger reduction in inequality (Sánchez and Pérez-Corral, 2018). According to 
OECD, “Countries which achieved large increases in the redistributive effect of ben-
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efits did so mainly through growing average benefit amounts, while the degree of 
benefit targeting (“progressivity”) changed less. The relatively small change in ben-
efit progressivity and its limited impact on the redistribution properties of cash trans-
fers highlights the importance of spending levels for inequality outcomes” (OECD, 
2011, p. 292).
2) The positive part of the NIT is much more redistributive than the current PIT. There 
are two main reasons. First, the minimum exemption is much higher than in the cur-
rent PIT (€10,310 vs €5,151). Second, the marginal tax rate (50%) is higher than the 
marginal tax rate in the current PIT (beginning from 24.75%). 
3) The benefits of the NIT are more important and redistributive than in the current 
system. There are several reasons to explain this result. First, the current benefit 
system requires that the “poor” person applies for the benefit but, in some cases, this 
person does not know the existence of the benefit or does not want to apply for it 
(non take-up problem). With the NIT this problem does not exist, because every 
citizen has to complete a tax return. Second, in the current non-contributory benefit 
system, the head of the household receives in many cases a fixed amount or an 
amount that increases slightly with the size of the family. However, with the NIT, 
each adult of the household receives the general amount and the children an addi-
tional 30%, therefore the amount of the NIT is much more generous than with the 
current system.
After these general inequality indexes, we analyse the average effective tax rates of the 
2013 Spanish tax-benefit system and the alternative NIT, considering households in deciles 
of equivalent income. As can be seen in the first columns of Table 7, the 2013 system is di-
vided into two tax rates, the personal income tax rate and the benefit rate of the non-contribu-
tory benefits. The combination of both measures is presented in the “Tax-Benefit” column 
and can be compared with the three proposals of NIT that are shown in the last columns of 
this table.
The average rate is 12.82% in the Spanish 2013 PIT, but this tax rate is very different by 
deciles. The households of the first decile are the only with a negative tax rate, due to the 
maternity tax credit received by some of these households. The rest of the deciles have 
positive tax rates, which are growing with the progressive tax until 22.55% in the last decile. 
On the contrary, the benefit system generates negative rates for all the households, but are 
especially important in the low-income households. The combination of both measures 
shows the progressivity of the Spanish tax-benefit system, with the first four deciles with 
average negative rates, and the continuous increase of the positive rates in the following 
deciles. 
Although these results seem important in terms of progressivity, are much more limited 
than the effects of the NIT. The three proposals maintain the same average tax rate for all the 
population than the current system (8.77%), but have a more important distributional effect. 
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The NIT produces higher negative rates than the current system for the lowest deciles of the 
distribution. However, with the NIT high-income taxpayers have to pay much more taxes 
than with the current system. The results of three proposals are very similar, but the NIT (c) 
is the most redistributive with an average tax rate slightly higher for the last decile (36.10%).
Table 7 
AVERAGE EFFECTIVE TAX-BENEFIT RATES (%)
Decile
2013 Spanish System
NIT (a) NIT (b) NIT (c)
PIT Benefits Tax-Benefit
1 -0.25 -172.08 -172.34 -445.13 -442.59 -443.53
2 0.15 -32.42 -32.27 -79.93 -80.62 -81.46
3 1.07 -11.09 -10.02 -37.07 -38.17 -38.8
4 2.49 -6.35 -3.86 -17.71 -18.97 -19.43
5 4.89 -3.77 1.12 -5.69 -6.95 -7.26
6 7.08 -2.7 4.39 3.37 2.14 1.89
7 9.61 -1.37 8.24 11.46 10.42 10.25
8 12.16 -0.75 11.4 18.2 17.53 17.37
9 15.47 -0.58 14.9 24.78 24.86 24.7
10 22.55 -0.22 22.33 33.59 35.42 36.1
Total 12.82 -4.06 8.77 8.78 8.77 8.76
Source: Own calculations.
Regarding the results on poverty, Table 8 shows the poverty rates developed by Foster, 
Greer and Thorbecke (1984). These indices vary in their meaning as a function of the param-
eter a employed. If a = 0, we are measuring the incidence (the percentage of poor popula-
tion); if a = 1, we are also taking into account the intensity (the distance between the income 
level of the poor and the poverty line); if a = 2, we are also considering inequality among 
the poor. These rates have been calculated for pre-tax and subsidies income, after-tax income 
(2013 Spanish IT and NIT proposals), and finally after applying the tax and non-contributo-
ry benefits.
Indexes have been calculated for a poverty line of 60% of the median income and also 
with the extreme poverty threshold (40% of the median income). In this exercise, we have 
anchored poverty lines, since the tax collection is positive in all the simulations.
Taking as a reference 60% of the median income, we can observe how the NIT be-
haviour is clearly superior to 2013 system in terms of poverty reduction. The 2013 Spanish 
IT increases slightly the incidence of poverty (from 27.2% to 27.6%). The other two indexes 
FGT (1) and FGT (2) also indicate a slight increase of poverty after the 2013 Spanish IT. 
However, non-contributory benefits have an important effect in the reduction of poverty, 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































However, the NIT proposals have much more intense results. Being an instrument that 
combines the tax with the transfers, the data of poverty improve dramatically. In any case, 
the incidence dropped by more than 15 percentage points in all three proposals, reaching an 
index below 12%. Even more striking is the decline of the other two indicators, when inten-
sity of poverty and inequality among the poor are taken into account. On the other hand, 
although the differences between the three proposals are very small, proposal (a), with a 
single rate of 50%, would reduce the incidence of poverty the least. 
But if we consider the severe poverty level (40% of pre-tax median income) as a po-
verty line, the results are more evident. This is not surprising since we have introduced a very 
important restriction when activating the negative part of the tax, when we have set the BI to 
the amount of the non-contributory benefit in Spain. This amount is clearly below 60% of 
the median, so the effect of NIT will be softened.
Again, 2013 Spanish IT is almost neutral in terms of poverty, and the non-contributory 
benefits reduce the poverty line more than one third (from 16.6% to 10.3%). But the effects 
of NIT are much more powerful than before, reducing the incidence rate to 2.7%. The FGT 
(1) indicates that the intensity falls dramatically, showing that those still below the threshold 
are closer to the extreme poverty line, while the FGT (2) is very close to zero, which shows 
less inequality among those who remain poor. Finally, it should be noted that the three pro-
posals offer exactly the same results in terms of reducing extreme poverty. 
The strong reduction of poverty indexes derived from the NIT scheme could be ex-
plained through two main reasons. First, the above-mentioned non-take up problem. The 
current benefit system requires that the “poor” households apply for the benefit but, in some 
cases, they do not do it. The NIT does not have this problem, as every citizen has to complete 
a tax return. Therefore, with the NIT the number of households who receive benefits is 
higher than with the current system, reducing the index of incidence of poverty FGT(0). 
Second, in the current non-contributory benefit system, the head of the household receives a 
fixed amount or an amount that increases slightly with the size of the family. However, with 
the NIT, each adult of the household receive the general amount and the children an addi-
tional 30%, therefore the amount of the NIT grows more sharply than with the current sys-
tem. This bigger amount allow more households to exit from poverty, reducing the FGT(0) 
index. Moreover, households that continue below the poverty line would have more dispos-
able income, reducing the intensity of poverty FGT(1) and the inequality within poor people 
FGT(2).
6.  Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed an alternative to the existing social protection system in 
Spain. Instead of a system with multiple benefits managed by different administrations, we 
propose a universal Basic Income that guarantees all citizens a minimum standard of living. 
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This Basic Income can be received in the form of a monetary benefit, but also through a 
refundable deduction included in the Income Tax, which would thus become negative (NIT).
Approaches to NIT have varied radically over time. Originally defended from liberalism, 
the arguments of redistributive justice are much more relevant today. Regardless of the rea-
sons given to justify it, NIT is a useful mechanism to introduce a Basic Income, because it 
allows the combination of the tax policy and the social policy into a single system.
We have put forward three alternative NIT proposals that have several common starting 
points. Firstly, these are proposals with a tax collection equivalent to the 2013 Spanish IT. 
To obtain this amount, we consider the resources generated by the NIT itself and also by the 
elimination of non-contributory benefits, which would no longer be necessary when a uni-
versal benefit was received. Secondly, every adult would have at least the minimum con-
tributory pension, so that people who lost these benefits would not be harmed by the intro-
duction of a negative tax. Thirdly, we have established for children a benefit equivalent to 
30% of the amount set for adults, according to the OECD equivalence scale. Our first pro-
posal is a NIT with a single rate of 50% and a minimum exemption of €10,310. From this 
proposal we have elaborated two other NITs, introducing a progressive tax schedule of two 
and three tax brackets respectively.
In order to carry out our simulations, we have used the 2014 Living Conditions Survey 
(with economic data from 2013) and adapted the socio-economic information contained to 
current Income Tax regulations, from which the new NIT will be derived. The results of the 
three proposals are very prominent, and similar to each other. With a NIT, it would be pos-
sible to maintain the collection of income tax, but the distribution of income would change 
radically, greatly reducing inequality and monetary poverty. In addition, there would be 
significant changes in the distribution by type of household. Families with children would 
benefit most from a negative income tax scheme, while households with older people would 
lose out on such reforms. Moreover, we can verify a strong redistribution within each type 
of household. Poor households in every case will be much better treated under NIT scheme 
than by the current system. Reversely, rich households will pay a bigger amount than before.
Finally, we would like to stress that the simulations carried out are static, and do not 
consider how the proposed changes could influence the decisions of citizens, such as saving 
behaviour or tax compliance. In this sense, it is especially important to take into considera-
tion the expected change of behaviour in the labour supply, which we will try to estimate in 
future research.
Notes
1. For an analysis of BI characteristics, see Salvador (2016) and Raventós (2001).
2. See Martínez Álvarez (2002) for a detailed analysis of Rhys-Williams plan.
106
3. Lampman (1965), Boskin (1967), Green y Lampman (1967), Hildebrand (1967), Rolph (1967) or Tobin et al. 
(1967).
4. We have used ECV-2014 instead of other databases, as EUROMOD, for two reasons. On the one hand, the 
Spanish Statistical Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE) has improved the quality of data since this 
wave: income data were performed using administrative registers from the Spanish Tax Agency. On the other 
hand, we have obtained a disaggregation of benefits from the INE, which allow us to improve the estimation 
of removing some benefits. For this year, EUROMOD data did not provide these improvements. 
5. The definition of the family unit relating to IT is covered in art. 82 of Law 35/2006, of 28 November, of Income 
Tax. Basically, a family unit is made up of a married couple (with or without young children), or a single par-
ent with young children.
6. According to Eurostat, the Median Equivalent Income in Spain was €13.268 in 2013 (ECV 2014). Therefore, 
the poverty threshold defined as 60%, 40% and 30% of the median would be €7,961, €5,307 and €3,980 re-
spectively.
7. For example, if we reduce the tax rate to 47% for taxpayers with tax bases below € 30,000, those with a 
higher income should pay a marginal rate of 85% to get an equivalent tax collection.
8. See Figure 2 for the Spanish Income Tax scheme.
9. We have calculated Atkinson and Theil indexes, using different parameters of inequality aversion. In all cases, 
the results draw similar conclusions as those presented for the Gini indexes. 
10. We have also calculated the re-ranking coefficients for all the alternatives. These coefficients are 0.004 for the 
current system and the three NIT alternatives, indicating that the re-ranking problem has not worsened with 
the NIT. 
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Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es plantear una alternativa financieramente viable al actual sistema de pro-
tección social español. Se trata de un impuesto negativo sobre la renta (INR), que tendría la virtud de 
unir en un solo mecanismo el sistema de prestaciones públicas y el Impuesto sobre la Renta. Tras ex-
poner las características básicas del INR, simulamos con la Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida varias 
propuestas de INR para España. Estas propuestas se caracterizan por no suponer un coste adicional en 
el sistema de impuestos-subvenciones. Los resultados de nuestras simulaciones indican una mejora 
sustancial en los indicadores de pobreza y desigualdad, especialmente de la pobreza severa y también 
una redistribución de la renta desde las personas mayores hacia las familias con niños.
Palabras clave: renta básica, impuesto negativo, pobreza, desigualdad, microsimulación.
Clasificación JEL: C8, H24, I38.
